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Abstract 
The ability to correctly interpret facial expressions is key to effective social 
interactions. We are well rehearsed and generally very efficient at correctly 
categorising expressions. However does our ability to do so depend on how 
cognitively loaded we are at the time? Using repeated measures designs we assessed 
the sensitivity of facial expression categorisation to cognitive resources availability by 
measuring people’s expression categorisation performance during concurrent low and 
high cognitive load situations. In Experiment1 participants categorised the six basic 
upright facial expressions in a 6-AFC response paradigm whilst maintaining low or 
high loading information in working memory (N= 40; 60 observations per load 
condition). In Experiment 2 they did so for both upright and inverted faces (N= 46; 60 
observations per load and inversion condition). In both experiments expression 
categorisation for upright faces was worse during high versus low load. Categorisation 
rates actually improved with increased load for the inverted faces. The opposing 
effects of cognitive load on upright and inverted expressions are explained in terms of 
a cognitive load related dispersion in the attentional window. Overall the findings 
support that expression categorisation is sensitive to cognitive resources availability 
and moreover suggest that, in this paradigm, it is the perceptual processing stage of 
expression categorisation that is affected by cognitive load. 
 
 
Keywords: Facial expression categorisation, working memory load, cognitive load, 
attentional window, affect processing. 
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Knowing How You Are Feeling Depends on What’s on My Mind: Cognitive Load and 
Expression categorisation 
 Facial expressions provide valuable socially relevant information. Not only do they 
offer insight into a person’s affective state, such as if they are angry or happy, but they also 
influence social judgments such as a person’s approachability or attractiveness and our 
empathetic response to them (Ickes, 1993; Willis, Palermo, & Burke, 2011). The ability to 
categorise facial expressions correctly and respond appropriately to them is critical for 
affective social interactions. Within social psychology, expression processing has been 
addressed from a multitude of approaches. One perspective has been to investigate the effect 
of local elements such as stimuli dimensions and presentation time, which are found to affect 
expression categorisation (for a review see Derntl, Seidel, Kainz & Carbon, 2009). Whilst the 
sensitivity of expression categorisation to more distal factors such as trait judgments of the 
emotion expresser (Said, Haxby & Todorov, 2011) and individual differences in the judger’s 
interpersonal sensitively (Hall, Andrzejewski &Yopchick, 2009) is also well documented. 
Thus evidence suggests that a combination of both local and distal factors ultimately 
determine expression categorisation ability. Here we employ a local level approach to 
investigate if facial expression categorisation occurs automatically or whether cognitive 
resources are required to make judgments. As reviewed below this is an important aspect of 
expression categorisation that requires further clarification. 
Automaticity of Affect Processing 
It has long been established that regardless of race and culture we are all remarkably 
adept at recognising certain basic emotions (Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 1969). This, 
together with the seemingly effortlessness, speeded (Lui, Harris & Kanwisher, 2002) and in 
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certain situations unconscious (Dimberg, Thunberg & Elmehed, 2000) and unavoidable 
(Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2001) processing of facial affect has led to the 
presumption that the process occurs automatically. However more recent findings have 
challenged this view. For instance the fact that, perception and affective response to emotive 
images can be modulated by individual differences (e.g. Nowicki & Duke, 1994; Hall, 
Andrzejewski &Yopchick, 2009), social relevance (e.g. Bublatzky, Gerdes, White, Riemer & 
Alpers, 2014), and cultural rearing (Biehl et al., 1997), suggests that the process is not fully 
automatic (for detailed reviews see Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-
Vidne & Cohen, 2013).  
A key assessment of a process’ automaticity is its reliance on cognitive resources 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Bargh, 1994). Findings from 
clinical populations support that processing of facial expressions fails this test of 
automaticity. For example, reductions in cognitive resources due to aging (Ruffman, Henry, 
Livingstone & Phillips, 2008) and brain injury (Yim, Babbage, Zupan, Neumann, & Willer, 
2013) have been associated with reduced facial expression judgments. The automaticity of a 
process in healthy populations is typically assessed by imposing concurrent cognitive load to 
temporarily reduce cognitive resource availability. If the process occurs equally well during 
no or low load conditions compared to high load conditions, it can be inferred that the 
process is not reliant on cognitive resources and thus occurs automatically. Such 
manipulations have been employed to examine the automaticity of affect processing from 
various avenues, these will be briefly reviewed before highlighting the motivation to 
investigate the relation between facial expression categorisation and cognitive load in the 
current studies. 
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Erk, Kleczar and Walter (2007) presented task irrelevant emotional stimuli between 
the presentation and test phase of a short-term memory task. The neural response to the 
valence stimuli was reduced in difficult versus easy versions of the memory trials. In Van 
Dillen, Heslenfeld and Koole’s (2009) paradigm the valent stimuli was presented first, then 
the cognitive task (easy or difficult arithmetic task). The neural activity in the emotion 
processing region, amygdala, was attenuated with increased load. And Roman et. al’s., (2015) 
study suggested that secondary task emotional stimuli only influence performance when 
cognitive resources are not fully occupied by a primary task. Collectively such findings 
support that the response to emotional stimuli is not automatic but rather sensitive to 
cognitive resources availability - when people are engaged in cognitively taxing tasks, the 
neural response to valence information is down-regulated.  
It is worth noting that the emotional information is was actually task irrelevant in the 
above paradigms. What affect might cognitive load have on the emotional stimuli when they 
are actually relevant to the task? Blair et al. (2007) presented valent stimuli in the presence or 
absence of a cognitively demanding numerosity task. Although behavioural responses to the 
valent stimuli were not recorded, the authors urged participants to attend to this information 
stating that they may be questioned on it later. Kellermann et al. (2012) insured the affective 
images were perceptually processed by using them as go-cues during low and high cognitive 
load conditions. In both studies, comparable to the passive viewing studies, the brain’s 
neuronal response to the emotional stimuli was attenuated in the presence of concurrent 
cognitive load. In Kron, Schul, Cohen and Hassin’s (2010) dual task paradigm, participants 
had to actually report the feeling elicited by valent stimuli. They found the intensity of self-
reported feelings were reduced whilst performing a concurrent cognitive load task rather than 
alone.  
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Collectively these studies support that the response evoked by valent stimuli during 
both passive and active viewing is reduced when cognitive resources are drained by a 
cognitively demanding secondary task. Whilst the modulation of affective response to 
emotional stimuli as a function of cognitive resources is informative and aids to decipher the 
automaticity of emotion processing, it does not answer the arguably more ecologically 
pertinent question of whether conscious recognition of emotional information is impacted 
when cognitive resources are engaged elsewhere. Are we able to correctly categorise a 
person’s facial expression regardless of our own personal cognitive state? Or are we more 
likely to make misjudgements when we interact with people in a cognitively loaded versus 
relaxed state? The current study aims to investigate the dynamic between cognitive load and 
affect from this alternative perspective, which despite being of prime social relevance has 
been tackled surprisingly sparsely.  A few previous studies have attempted to shed light on 
the relation, but as reviewed below, there is still scope to further clarify the interplay between 
cognitive resources and facial expression categorisation.  
Tracy and Robins (2008) aimed to evaluate the automaticity of expression 
categorisation by manipulating two factors; the time allowable to make a response and 
concurrent cognitive load. Participants were instructed to make a two alternative forced 
choice response (yes/no) to the target emotion’s appearance. Judgments were made under 
fast, deliberation and concurrent cognitive load conditions (1000ms, 8000ms, and 1500ms to 
respond respectively). The face stimuli remained on screen until a response was made or the 
response window had lapsed. The accuracy rates did not differ between the fast and cognitive 
conditions. However, in comparison to the deliberate condition, categorisation accuracy was 
comparatively lower in the cognitive condition for fear, sadness and surprise, but not the 
remaining emotions (anger, contempt, disgust, happiness, and pride). This does indicate that 
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categorisation of particular emotions is impaired by cognitive limitations, however since the 
response windows were unequal across conditions, interpreting the cause of the differential 
performance across conditions is problematic. Furthermore the 2-AFC paradigm is not the 
best representation of real-life expression judgments – we rarely question ‘do these faces look 
surprised or not?’Rather, we judge which of several pre-existing emotional categories a 
processed facial expression is closest to.  
Philips, Channon, Tunstall, Hedenstrom and Lyons (2008) assessed the impact of 
cognitive load on this type of expression categorisation ability. They asked people to 
categorise upright emotions with varying degrees of intensity (50, 75 and 100%) as one of the 
displayed options (2, 4 or 6 choices) under no load and dual load (2-back task) conditions. 
Emotion categorisation accuracy was overall lower in the dual compared to no load 
condition.  The load related accuracy deterioration was unaffected by emotion intensity, but 
the effect increased as a function of the number of response choices. The authors interpreted 
this to imply that in this scenario perceptual processing of facial emotions are not affected but 
it is the verbal naming of expressions that is sensitive to cognitive load. However, the 
paradigm compared no load task performance with dual task. Equating performance change 
in the dual task to cognitive resource reductions in such comparisons is problematic, as the 
effects may be due to the distraction effect of the additional secondary task rather than 
cognitive resources limitations per se (Kron, et al., 2010). Thus direct tests of cognitive load’s 
effect on expression categorisation have been rare. And whilst previous research suggests that 
expression categorisation may be sensitive to cognitive load, arguably paradigm limitations 
restrict the conclusiveness of the effect, warranting further clarification. 
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Overview of the Current Research 
In the current studies we used a popular expression categorisation task (Ekman, et al., 
1969) - participants were presented with a single facial expression and tasked to categorise it 
as one of the six basic facial emotions (happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise and disgust). The 
expression was presented for a fixed time of 250ms, followed by the response screen which 
remained until a response was made. These timings were kept consistent across all conditions 
and the expression categorisation always occurred in a dual task scenario. The only variable 
was the degree of concurrent cognitive load.  Participants were instructed to retain six 
sequential (low load) or random numbers (high load) in memory for later recall, comprising 
the concurrent low and high cognitive load conditions respectively.  
In Experiment 1 upright images were used to firstly assess the effect of this cognitive 
load manipulation on expression categorisation ability. As previous literature implies that 
expression categorisation is to some degree reliant on cognitive resources (e.g. Tracy & 
Robbins, 2008; Philips et al., 2008) and secondly previous studies using comparable 
cognitive load manipulations have found cognitive resources reliant task performance is 
hindered in the high versus low load condition (e.g. Hester, Murphy & Garavan, 2004; Lavie, 
Hirst, de Fockert & Viding, 2004), we predicted that expression categorisation would be 
reduced during high compared to the low concurrent load condition. In line with this 
prediction, concurrent high compared to low cognitive load did hinder expression 
categorising in Experiment 1. 
 In Experiment 2 we attempted to further explore the cause of the deterioration. 
Recent studies have proposed a cognitive load related dispersion in the attentional window as 
a mechanism for the reduced performance of cognitive resources reliant visual tasks (e.g. 
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Ahmed & de Fockert 2012a; Ahmed & de Fockert 2012b).  In Experiment 2 we tested 
whether a similar mechanism was responsible for the altered processing of the socially 
pertinent visual stimuli used in the current studies i.e. facial expressions. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants1. Forty undergraduate students volunteered to participate in the study as 
part fulfilment of their course requirement, including 30 females (M= 19.97 years, SD = 2.17) 
and 10 males (M= 20.40 years, SD = 2.88). Twenty six noted their ethnicity as Caucasian, 
three Asian, five Black Afro Caribbean, three of mixed ethnicity and two ethnicities were 
undeclared2. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Apparatus. The experiment was presented on an individual PC using E-Prime 
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002), responses were collected using a 
standard keyboard. Participants were tested in individual cubicles, seated approximately 50 
cm from a 21x28cm monitor.  
Tasks.  The experiment consisted of two components, a WM task and a facial 
expression categorisation task. Firstly, participants were presented with a string of 6 digits 
                                                          
1 For Experiment 1, the required sample size was estimated by using an alpha of .05 and beta of .8. The effect 
size used (d =0.544), and prediction (one-tailed) was guided by research that used the same WM load 
manipulations (i.e. six digits in sequential versus random order; Ahmed & deFockert, 2012). These values when 
entered into G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) yielded a required sample size of 24. 
 
2 Analysis of the expression categorisation task data including ethnicity (Caucasian, non-Caucasian) as an 
additional between subjects factor was conducted for both Experiments. In both cases the main effect ethnicity 
and its interactions were non-significant (p >.2 and F < 1.3 in all cases). See general discussion for further 
remarks on this point.  
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either in ascending sequential order (low WM load) or in random order (high WM load) to 
retain in memory.  The digits were presented horizontally and centrally in 32-point Arial bold 
font, in white, on a black background. There were four sequential six digit low WM load 
sequences and 48 random order six digit sequences for the high WM load. 
Participants were then presented with the face stimuli and tasked to categorise the 
expression as one of the six possible options. Finally a single-digit memory probe was 
presented, requiring a judgment of whether it was ‘present’ or absent’ in the initial digit 
sequence (see Figure 1). The experiment had a repeated measures design, in that each 
participant completed the expression categorisation task under both WM load conditions. 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
Materials. The face stimuli were taken from the NimStim database of Facial 
Expression images, which have high overall validity (79%) and reliability (between 79-
100%) for the expression judgments (Tottenham et al., 2009). The first ten Caucasian male 
and female individuals were selected from the database, and their expressions representing 
the six basic emotions; happy, sad, fear, surprise, anger and disgust were included in the 
Experiment, resulting in a total of 120 images. All images were upright, in colour and of 
actors, aged between 21- 30 years. The images subtended a visual angle of 16.67° 
horizontally and 20.83° vertically.  
Procedure. Ethical approval was achieved from the institutional ethics committee 
prior to data collection. Informed consent was achieved prior to, and all participants were 
debriefed following participation.  
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The WM 6-digit sequence was presented for 2000ms, followed by a 1500ms blank 
screen, then the face stimuli for 250ms, followed by the facial categorising response screen 
displaying the 6 possible expression options (1= happy, 2 = sad, 3= fear, 4= surprise, 5= 
anger and 6 = disgust). Finally the single digit WM probe response screen. The response 
screens did not have a fixed presentation interval but rather moved on following the 
participant’s response.   
On each trial, the 6-digit sequences were randomly selected from the list of 4 or 48 
sequences for the low and high WM load sequences respectively. Across the experiment, the 
WM probe was present or absent in the original sequence equally as often, and when present 
was equally as likely to occur in any of the 6 digit positions. Participants were instructed to 
press the ‘w’ key if they thought the probe had been present and the ‘s’ key if they thought it 
had been absent in the original sequence. Response mappings were counterbalanced across 
participants.  A series of 5 face stimulus-response screen cycles were presented between the 
digit sequence and probe screens. The face stimuli were randomly selected from the possible 
120 options without repetition.  
WM load was manipulated between blocks, with one block of each load presented per 
experiment.  Each WM block consisted of 12 WM, and 60 face trials (i.e. 60 observations per 
WM load condition). Thus across the experiment participants responded to 120 face stimuli 
in total (20 of each expression type), half under each WM load condition. WM load block 
order (e.g. low WM block 1st or 2nd) was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants completed a short practice (4 WM trials and 20 face trials per WM block) 
before commencing the experiment. Incorrect response feedback was provided in the practice 
but not experimental blocks. Written and verbal instructions urged participants to respond as 
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quickly and as accurately as possible and also that both components of the task were equally 
as important.   
Data Analysis 
The mean accuracy and RTs for correct WM trials were computed for each individual 
and are reported for all proceeding analysis. As the main objective is to assess the impact 
WM load has on expression categorisation, for the Face task accuracy analysis, incorrect 
memory response trials were excluded to ensure only trials in which participants were 
performing both tasks were analysed, and the RT analysis was based on correct Face and 
WM trials only for the same reasoning (see Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). p-
values adjusted for one –tailed comparisons are denoted by an asterisk (*). Post hoc t-test 
analyses were tested against Bonferroni corrected significance levels (p <.025). 
Results  
WM task. As anticipated, the accuracy level was higher in the low WM load (M = 
87.35%, SD = 1.49) compared to the high WM load trials (M = 81.90%, SD = 1.66). The 
result of a Paired sample t-test confirmed that the difference was significant, t(39) = 2.068, p 
= .023*, d =0.327. A similar comparison of the mean RTs on correct Low (M = 1860.09, SD 
= 410.95) and high WM (M = 1765.76, SD = 411.25) trials revealed that RTs did not vary as 
a function of WM load (p = .087, t = 1.75). 
Expression categorisation task. Expression categorisation was more accurate when 
concurrent WM load was low (M = 80.33%, SD = 7.41) compared to high (M = 76.73%, SD 
= 8.25). RTs during the two WM conditions were very similar, 1478.78ms (SD = 361.65) 
during low and 1481.86ms (323.97) during high WM load (see Table 1).  The results of 
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paired sampled t-tests revealed that the effect of WM load on RTs was not significant (p 
=.93, t = .-09). However the detrimental impact of increased WM load on the ability to 
categorise expressions correctly was significant, t(39) = 2.681, p = .011, d = 0.459 
Expression type analysis. Categorisation accuracy levels are known to vary across 
the six basic facial expressions used (happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) (e.g. 
Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). In order to assess if there was a main effect of 
expression type and also whether the impact of WM load differed as a function of expression 
type, we conducted some additional analysis. Two 2x6 ANOVAs, with WM Load (low, and 
high) and expression type (fear, disgust, sad surprise, anger, happy) (ten observations per 
expression type cell) as within subjects factors were conducted on the RT and accuracy data. 
The main effect of WM load was approaching significance F(1, 39) = 3.838 p = .057, 
2 = 0.090. The accuracy ANOVA revealed a strong main effect of expression type, F(5, 
195) = 78.90, p < .001, 2 = 0.669. Happy stimuli were the easiest to categorise (96.8%), 
followed by anger, surprise, sad and disgust. The accuracy of correctly categorising fearful 
faces was by far the lowest at 50.9% (see Table 2 and Figure 2). The interaction between 
WM load and expression type was not significant (p = .2, F = 1.47), indicating that WM 
load’s detrimental impact on categorising faces was indiscriminate of expression type. 
The equivalent ANOVA on mean RTs on correct trials revealed a main effect of 
expression type, F(5, 195) = 90.264, p < .001, 2 = .698. Fastest responses were to happy 
faces and slowest for fearful faces. The speed of responding to the different faces closely 
followed the same pattern as the accuracy data, indicating an absence of speed-accuracy trade 
off (see Table 2). The main effect of WM load, and WM load by expression type interaction 
were not significant for the RTs (p = .46, F = .57 and p = .6, F = .73 respectively).  
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Discussion 
In Experiment 1 expression categorisation performance was recorded during low and 
high concurrent load conditions. In line with previous findings (e.g. Ekman et al., 1969) the 
ease by which each of the six expressions were categorised varied significantly. Happy 
stimuli were the easiest to categorise closely followed by anger, surprise, sad and disgust. 
Fearful faces were categorised the least accurately. The comparative ease of categorising 
different expressions is sensitive to paradigm specifics such as stimuli dimensions, 
presentation time and task instructions (for a review see Derntl, et al., 2009). The current 
pattern of accuracy rates paralleled those of comparable paradigms (such as Derntl et al., 
2009; Prkachin, 2003), thus replicating the known differential categorisation accuracies for 
the basic expressions.   
The novel objective of Experiment 1 was to assess the effect cognitive load has on the 
ability to affectively categorise these facial expressions. The results demonstrated that the 
speed of responses were the same under the two load conditions; however the accuracy of the 
judgments were significantly affected by cognitive load. Participants were worse at 
categorising the expressions during high compared to low concurrent load. Interestingly the 
interaction between cognitive load and expression type was not significant; indicating that the 
detrimental impact of cognitive load is similar for the six basic expressions tested. Possible 
reasons for this are addressed in the general discussion.  
The current findings build on preceding literature that infers a relation between 
expression categorisation and cognitive resources. Previous studies have compared 
expression categorisation in no load compared to dual task situations, or with varying 
response windows which limits inferring causality of performance changes directly to 
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reduced cognitive resources (e.g. Tracy & Robbins, 2008; Philips et al., 2008). Since the 
number of response options, presentation time and response window were all kept consistent 
in current study, and expression categorisation was always conducted in a dual task scenario; 
the only variable was the level of cognitive load in the secondary WM task, the hindered 
expression categorisation in Experiment 1 can be equated more confidently to reduced 
cognitive resources. Moreover as the reduced expression categorisation in the current study 
occurred whilst number of response options was kept consistent, it implies cognitive load 
impacts a stage of expression processing other than response selection. Categorising 
expressions is a three stage process. Firstly the perceptual information is processed, this is 
then interpreted as a particular expression, and finally a manual response mapping the 
interpretation to available options is made. As explained below, we suggest the current 
cognitive load effects are occurring at the perceptual processing rather than response 
selection stage. 
Visual attention acts like a window or ‘spotlight’, which can be adjusted, allowing us 
to focus the spotlight on relevant, and ignore irrelevant information (Eriksen & St James, 
1986; Jonides, 1983). Several recent studies suggest that increasing cognitive load causes the 
distribution of the attentional window to become dispersed or spread out. For example, 
Ahmed and de Fockert (2012b) recorded Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) performance 
during concurrent low and high cognitive load. In this task participants respond to a central 
target whilst ignoring peripheral distracting information. The pattern of interference from 
peripheral distractors indicated that the profile of the attentional window was more spread out 
(more global) when concurrent cognitive load was high compared to low. This cognitive load 
related dispersion of the attentional window was further assessed utilising the Navon 
paradigm (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012a). Navon letters are hierarchical global stimuli that are 
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made up of smaller local level ones (Navon, 1977). Participants found it easier to attend to 
the global letter under high compared to low load, and more difficult to do so when attending 
to the local letter– both effects additionally support a dispersion of the attentional window as 
a function of cognitive load. Similar effects were also reported by Marguc, Forester and Van 
Kleef (2011). The authors cognitively loaded their participants by asking them to solve 
demanding or easy anagrams before completing a Navon task - performance on the 
subsequent Navon task demonstrated that the attentional setting was more global following 
the demanding rather than easy situation. Finally Van der Linden and Eling (2006) using a 
different measure of cognitive depletion; mental fatigue, found a similar effect of cognitive 
limitations on attentional settings. Thus substantial evidence supports that depletion in 
cognitive resources can cause the attentional window to become more dispersed or spread 
out. As explained below, we suggest that this phenomenon underlies the reduced expression 
categorisation with increased cognitive load recorded in Experiment 1. 
It is known that rather than processing individual features of faces (e.g. eye and nose) 
analytically, we typically process the whole face as a gestalt (Young, Hellawell & Hay, 1987; 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993). The same applies for facial expressions; the optimal (and 
consequently default) setting for facial expression processing is typically holistic (e.g. Calder, 
Young, Keane & Dean, 2000; Tanaka, Kaiser, Butler & Le Grand, 2012). A plausible 
explanation for the observed decline in expression categorisation during high load is that the 
cognitive load related dispersion in the attentional window spreads the attentional setting 
away from the default ideal global setting. This ‘over globalisation’ of the attentional window 
is what makes it harder to correctly categorise expressions during high compared to low 
cognitive load. Evidence congruent with this proposal is evident in Martin, Slessor, Allen, 
Phillips and Darling’s (2012) study. The authors measured facial expressions categorising 
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after the attentional setting was altered by priming. Compared to local priming, the ability to 
correctly identify expressions in upright faces was reduced when attention was dispersed by 
global priming. This pattern is comparable to the reduction in expression categorisation for 
upright faces under high WM load in the current study and supports that this effect may be 
due to a dispersion of the attentional setting.  
In Experiment 2 we used both upright and inverted faces to further corroborate the 
attentional dispersion account. Ample evidence supports that face orientation solicits 
different processing styles; upright faces are processed in a task adaptive holistic manner, 
whereas inversion impedes this naturalistic holistic processing of faces and promotes more 
local or feature based processing, which is a less appropriate setting for expression 
categorisation (Yin, 1969; Young et al., 1987; Calder et al., 2000). The differential attentional 
settings accompanying these stimuli types provides an excellent test for the notion that 
cognitive load causes a dispersion in the attentional window.  
In Experiment 2, for upright faces, cognitive load is anticipated to disperse attention 
away from the optimal global setting, and as in Experiment 1 expression categorisation 
accuracy is predicted to be lower under high compared to low load. However, for inverted 
faces, high cognitive load is predicted to shift processing from the inversion solicited local 
setting to a more task appropriate holistic setting, consequently improving expression 
categorisation in inverted faces. Thus if the decline in expression categorisation is a result of 
cognitive load related dispersion in the attention window, then differential effects of 
cognitive load are anticipated for the upright and inverted faces.  
Experiment 2 
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In Experiment 1 participants responded to upright faces under concurrent low and 
high WM load. In Experiment 2 the additional factor of orientation was included. A within 
subjects 2x2 design was used to record expression categorisation for the six emotions, in both 
upright and inverted faces, under concurrent low and high WM load.   
Method 
Participants3. Forty six undergraduate students volunteered to participate in the study 
as part fulfilment of their course requirement, including 25 females (M= 22.96 years, SD = 
4.93) and 21 males. Thirty nine noted their ethnicity as Caucasian, three Asian, two Black 
Afro Caribbean and two as Arabic. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision (see 
footnote 2).  
Materials and Procedure. The upright condition was the same as Experiment 1. The 
inverted condition was also the same, with the exception that the 120 images were presented 
following a 180° rotation. Thus there were 60 observations per WM load and inversion 
condition. Condition type (e.g. Upright condition 1st or 2nd) was counter balanced across 
participants. Participants completed the 2nd condition 2 weeks after completing the 1st. See 
Figure 1 for sample of upright and inverted images. Once again, a repeated measures design 
was employed, in that each participant completed the expression categorisation task under 
both WM load and inversion conditions. 
Results 
                                                          
3 For Experiment 2’s within subjects factorial design, the sample size required for the theoretically pertinent 
effect (i.e. interaction) was estimated by using an alpha of .05 and beta of .8. The observed effect size for the 
expression categorisation task in Experiment 1 (d =.459) and a two-tailed prediction was used. The calculation 
yielded a sample size of 30. 
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WM task. A repeated measures 2x2 ANOVA with Face Orientation (upright, 
inverted) and WM load (low, high) was conducted to assess memory performance across 
conditions. The main effect of WM load was significant; F(1,45) = 21.604, p < .001, 2 = 
0.324. As in Experiment 1, the mean accuracy rates were higher when concurrent WM load 
was low (M = 87.39%, SD = 11.36) compared to high (M = 78.21%, SD = 13.11). Accuracy 
rates were higher during upright compared to inverted trials (M = 84.96%, SD = 11.13 and M 
= 80.83%, SD = 12.40) respectively, F(1,45) = 6.121, p =.016, 2 = 0.121. The orientation 
and WM load interaction was non-significant (F = .527, p = .47). The RTs for upright images 
during low and high concurrent load were, M = 1865.75, SD = 681.50 and M = 1852.93, SD = 
738.40; and M = 2045.81, SD = 919.87 and M = 1919.92, SD = 735.12 for inverted images 
during low and high load respectively. A similar 2x2 ANOVA for the mean RTs revealed that 
both main effects and the interaction were non-significant (F < 3.49, p > .068 in all cases) 
Expression categorisation task. The mean accuracy and RTs for correct face trials 
were computed for each individual and analysed in two 2x2 ANOVAs with Face Orientation 
(upright, inverted) and WM load (low, high) as within subjects factors. The RTs ANOVA 
revealed all main effects and the interaction were not significant, (F < .3, p >.5 in all cases).   
The accuracy ANOVA revealed a main effect of Face Orientation, F(1,45) = 32.908, 
p < .001, 2 = 0.422. Participants were less accurate when categorising expressions in 
inverted (M = 68.57%, SD = 13.00) compared to upright faces (M = 79.42%, SD = 6.65) thus 
replicating the face inversion effect.  
The main effect of WM Load was not significant (p =.70, F = .151). However 
relevant to the research hypothesis the interaction between WM Load and Face Orientation 
was reliable, F(1,45) = 34.120, p < .001, 2 = .431), indicating that WM load differentially 
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affected the ability to categorise expressions depending on the orientation of the face (see 
Figure 3 and Table 1). As in Experiment 1, when responding to upright faces participants 
were more accurate when WM Load was low (M= 81.85%, SD = 7.62) compared to high (M= 
77%, SD = 8.57). In contrast, for the inverted faces, participants’ ability to correctly 
categorise expressions actually improved as WM load was increased from low (M = 65.76%, 
SD = 13.90) compared to high WM load (M = 71.37%, SD = 13.70).  
Follow up pairwise comparisons confirmed that the detrimental effect of load when 
categorising upright faces (t (45) = 3.545, p < .001*, d = 0.523, and the beneficial effect on 
expression categorisation when faces were inverted (t (45) = 4.372, p < .001, d = 0.644 were 
both significant.  
Expression type analysis. Similar to Experiment 1, further analysis, 2x2x6 
ANOVAs, incorporating expression type (fear, disgust, sad surprise, anger, happy) (ten 
observations per expression type cell) as an additional factor were conducted to probe if 
categorisation of particular expressions were affected differentially by the other factors.  
The main effect of Expression Type was significant F (5, 225) = 113.810, p <.001, 2 
= .717. Overall Happy stimuli were the easiest to categorise (93.1%), followed by surprise, 
sad, anger and disgust (83.7, 78.6, 73.4, and 72.8 respectively). The accuracy of correctly 
categorising fearful faces was by far the lowest; 43.4% (see Table 2).  
The interaction between Expression and Orientation was also significant, F (5, 225) = 
6.256, p <.001, 2 = .122. For the upright faces the differential face categorisation accuracies 
mostly followed a similar pattern to that in Experiment 1 (Figure 2); happy faces were 
categorised most accurately, followed closely by surprise, anger, sad, disgust and finally fear. 
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The order of accuracy levels was the same for inverted faces, the only notable difference was 
that angry face categorisation was impacted substantially more by inversion (See Figure 2). 
The three way interaction between Orientation, WM load and Expression Type was 
not significant (F = 1.325, p =.25), indicating that WM load did not differentially affect 
particular expressions at either orientation. The remaining effects were in line with the above 
detailed 2x2 ANOVA.  
The equivalent RT ANOVA was conducted on correct trials data. For the RTs there 
was a main effect of expression type, F(5, 180) = 44.564, p < .001, 2 = 0.553, and an 
expression by orientation interaction, F(5, 180) = 3.017, p = .012, 2 = 0.077. For both these 
effects, the pattern closely followed that of the accuracy data, indicating an absence of speed-
accuracy trade off (see Table 2). The remaining main effects, and interactions were not 
reliable for the RTs (F < 3.1, p > .5, in all cases). 
Discussion  
Categorisation rates for the six expressions in upright faces in Experiment 2 closely 
paralleled the pattern recorded in Experiment 1; happy and fear were categorised the most 
and least well respectively; the remaining expressions accuracy rates fell between these two. 
Categorisation accuracy of the six emotions also varied for the inverted faces and the pattern 
of accuracy levels was similar to upright faces. The only notable difference was that angry 
face categorisation was impacted substantially more by inversion. This pronounced impact of 
inversion for angry faces was also detected by Prkachin (2003). The authors suggest anger is 
accompanied with changes in the mouth and nose region that are shared with other emotions 
(sadness, fear and disgust). Scrutiny of the distinct feature; stare of the focused eyes, is 
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required for correct categorisation of anger. Inversion may make distinctions based on this 
isolated feature harder which leads to the exaggerated impact of inversion for this emotion. 
Orientation of the face had a substantial impact on expression categorisation accuracy. 
Participants were less accurate when categorising expressions in inverted compared to 
upright faces; thus the face inversion effect was replicated (Yin, 1969; Calder et al., 2000). 
The novel and pertinent finding was that, increased cognitive load did not detrimentally 
impact performance in all conditions, but rather the effect depended on whether the to-be 
processed face was upright or inverted. As in Experiment 1, for upright faces, accuracy of 
expression type judgments were lower in high compared to low load. In contrast, the ability 
to correctly categorise expressions improved with cognitive load when the presented face was 
inverted. The differential effect of cognitive load on categorising expressions as a function of 
face orientation is consistent with the cognitive load related dispersion of attentional window 
explanation. According to this notion, performance for upright faces is worse during high 
load as the attentional setting is dispersed away from the default optimal global setting in this 
situation. Whilst, categorisation of inverted faces actually improves when with cognitive load 
because the dispersed setting shifts processing from the local to more task appropriate global 
setting in this case. 
Finally, as in Experiment 1, there was an absence of an expression by cognitive load 
interaction, indicating that cognitive load does not differentially affect categorisation of 
particular expressions in the current stimuli set. Reasons for this and alternative scenarios 
where an interaction may occur, together with the theoretical implications of the attentional 
window based explanation of the load effect are evaluated next. 
General Discussion 
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As reviewed in the introduction, numerous studies have uncovered an interactive 
effect between cognitive resources and affect processing. It is known that the neural response 
to passively viewed (Erk et al., 2007 and Van dillen et al., 2009) and actively attended 
affective stimuli (Blair et al., 2007), and the subjective experience of feelings (Kron et al., 
2010) are all reduced in the presence of concurrent cognitive load. The current findings 
complement this body of literature and demonstrate that the ability to categorise expressions 
in upright faces is similarly hampered when cognitive resources are reduced.  
We then employed both upright and inverted images to assess the mechanism of 
cognitive load’s effect on expression categorisation. Whereas the efficiency of correctly 
categorising expressions in upright faces was reduced with load, the performance actually 
improved with load for inverted faces (see Figure 3). This differential effect of cognitive load 
is congruent with a cognitive load related dispersion in the attentional window (Ahmed & de 
Fockert 2012b; Marguc et al., 2011). It is known that upright and inverted faces solicit 
comparatively more holistic and local processing respectively (Yin, 1969; Calder et al., 
2000). We propose that during upright face processing, the load-related dispersion in the 
attentional window causes an ‘over globalisation’ of the attentional window, expanding the 
setting away from the default optimal, resulting in the decreased expression categorisation.  
In contrast, for inverted faces, the dispersion shifts processing style from a local to a more 
task relevant holistic setting, improving expression categorisation in this case. Thus the 
current findings not only demonstrate expression categorisation is sensitive to cognitive load 
but go further by elucidating the underlying attentional mechanism inflicting the effects.  
The current findings are compatible with the attentional explanation but is there 
alternative support that facial expression processing may be affected by changes in the 
attentional window? As far as we are aware cognitive load’s effects on expression 
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categorisation have not been examined from this prospective previously, however several 
alternative studies have found similar effects when the attentional window has been 
modulated by alternative means. For example, Martin et al. (2012) altered the attentional 
setting of participants by asking them to respond to local or global levels of Navon stimuli 
prior to performing an expression categorisation task. Comparable to the current findings, 
they found global priming reduced expression categorisation of upright faces. Whereas 
Weston and Perfect (2005) found altering the attentional setting via such priming methods 
similarly affects face identity recognition. Furthermore, Schmid, Bombari, Mast and 
Lobmaier (2011) found that the altered attentional settings associated with happy and sad 
moods, influence expression categorisation performance. Collectively such findings validate 
that expression categorisation is impacted when the attentional window settings are altered by 
priming or mood. The current studies add to this, by demonstrating a similar influence on 
expression categorisation when the attentional setting is modulated by imposed cognitive 
load.  
Next we briefly reflect on the categorisation rates of the different expressions used. 
Categorisation accuracy levels are known to vary across the six basic facial expressions used 
(happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) (e.g. Ekman et al., 1969). In the current 
experiments, happy stimuli were the easiest to categorise closely followed by anger, surprise, 
sad and disgust. Fearful faces were categorised the least accurately. The expression 
categorisation rates replicated previous patterns in comparable paradigms (e.g. Derntl et al., 
2009; Prkachin, 2003). The novel aspect was assessing the interaction between cognitive load 
and specific expressions. Previous literature has demonstrated that experimental factors such 
as inversion and presentation time (Prkachin, 2003 and Derntl et al., 2009) have a differential 
impact on the six basic expressions, moreover evidence for the processing preference of 
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particular expressions also exists (e.g. Fox et al., 2000). Thus the possibility of a differential 
influence of cognitive load on the different expression types was plausible. Although there 
were main effects of both expression type and WM load, the WM load by expression 
interaction was not significant, signifying that particular expressions are not differentially 
affected by cognitive load (see Table 2 & Figure 2). However it is important to acknowledge 
that the absence on this effect could be due to a Type II error. Whilst the repeated measures 
study was amply powered to detect the 2x2 effects (see footnotes 1&3) and included 60 
observations per condition for these comparisons, the per condition observations were only 
ten for the by emotion type analysis. Whilst previous 6-AFC expression categorisation 
studies have based by emotion analysis ranging from 5 to 18 observations per emotion (e.g. 
Ekman et al., 1969; Philips et al., 2008; Derntl et al., 2009), recent guidelines suggest that 
observations less than 20 are not adequate to capture most behavioural effects (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The study would thus need to be replicated with more 
observations at this level to claim with confidence that particular emotions are not 
differentially impacted by cognitive load availability. 
Theoretical Implications 
From a theoretical prospective the current findings affirm the robustness and 
generalisability of a load-related dispersion in the attentional window. The effect has 
previously been recorded using letter and word stimuli (Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012a; Ahmed 
& de Fockert, 2012b; Marguc et al., 2011). The current findings support that the cognitive 
load related shift from local to holistic settings also impacts environmentally more relevant 
facial expression stimuli in a similar manner. How these findings further our understating of 
facial expression categorisation is reflected on in this section. 
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LeDoux (1996) and Davidson and Irwin (1999) proposed that emotions are conscious 
experiences and thus must be represented in working memory. As such they are reliant on 
cognitive resources and therefore should be sensitive to limitations in these. This general 
view has been refined since to account for specific empirical findings. For example, Van 
Dillen and Koole (2007) explain cognitive load’s attenuation effect on passively viewed 
valent stimuli in terms of a distraction effect; the distraction hypothesis. Whilst Kron et al. 
(2010) proposed the mere resource hypothesis, which explains that both conscious feelings 
and cognitive tasks draw on cognitive resources and thus the experience of feelings is 
diminished in the presence of cognitive load. The impact of cognitive limitations on 
immediate categorisation of facial expressions observed in the current study are in line with 
these general theoretical views but advance on these by proposing the attentional window 
based account as a more precise explanation of cognitive load’s impact in this particular 
scenario of affect processing.   
Categorising expressions is a three stage process. Firstly the perceptual information is 
processed, this is then interpreted as a particular expression, and finally a manual response 
mapping the interpretation to available options is made. Currently there is not a consensus on 
which stages are affected by cognitive load. Philips et al. (2008) found that cognitive load did 
not impact expression categorisation as a function of intensity of expressions. The authors 
interpreted this to indicate that the perceptual processing of expressions is not reliant on 
cognitive resources. Conversely, the authors found that expression categorisation ability 
decreases as number of response options to choose from are increased, evidencing that 
cognitive load affects the response selection stage of expression categorisation. However, 
even in the two category choice option the accuracy difference between no and dual 
conditions were substantial, implying that the number of response options alone cannot 
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wholly account for the observed cognitive load effects. Moreover, Lynn et al. (2016), used a 
two label task, ‘angry’ and ‘not angry’, to assess the ability of individuals naturally varying in 
cognitive resources, high and low working memory capacity (WMC) participants, to 
correctly categorise the expressions. The low WMC individuals were worse at making correct 
categorisations even in the two option paradigm compared to individuals with greater 
cognitive resources i.e. high WMC individuals. Once more indicating that cognitive resources 
are required for a stage other than response selection. 
In the current experiments load effects were found when the number of response 
options were kept consistent, and also opposing effects of load were found based on facial 
orientation – these effects are hard to consolidate with cognitive load solely affecting the 
label choice stage. Alternatively, they support that the perceptual stage of expression 
categorisations is sensitive to cognitive load.  
But why might imposed cognitive load affect the perceptual processing stage in some 
scenarios (Lynn et al., 2016) but not others (Philips et al., 2008)? We consider that image 
presentation time may be an important determinant.  Within the expression categorisation 
literature presentation time is viewed as an indicator of cognitive effort required for 
processing, and images have been presented using a variety of timings, ranging from 33ms to 
15seconds (see Derntl et al., 2009 for a review). Generally accuracy rates improve as 
presentation times are elongated, at least prior to celling effects taking effect. Philips et al. 
(2008) displayed faces for 3 seconds, whereas the presentation times in the current and Lynn 
et al.’s (2016) paradigm were comparatively much shorter (250ms and 500ms respectively). 
Thus the sensitivity of perceptual processing to cognitive load seems to be linked to 
presentation time – if ample time is provided perceptual processing is less affected by 
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cognitive load, whereas during shorter more cognitively effortful presentations, cognitive 
load has a greater influence.  
Collectively these findings support that cognitive load can impact expression 
categorisation at various stages; the current and Lynn et al.’s (2016) findings support an 
influence at the perceptual processing stage, whilst Philip et al.’s (2008) findings establish an 
impact at the later response selection stage. Investigations of individual differences in the 
perceptual and labelling stages of expression categorisations reveal that, at best performances 
on the two are only partially correlated (Croker & McDonald, 2005; Palermo, O’Connor, 
Davis, Irons, & McKone, 2013), indicating that the two processes are somewhat distinct. 
Future studies would need to incorporate factorial designs in which presentation time and 
number of response options are manipulated to tease apart the comparative impact cognitive 
load has on each sub-process of expression categorisation. Moreover given that everyday 
social encounters can require inferences of affective states during either sustained gaze or 
brief glances of facial expressions, further work exploring the interaction between 
presentation time and cognitive load is of both empirical and social importance. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the controlled design used provided a clearer test of the effect that 
concurrent cognitive load has on basic expression categorisation it is important to 
acknowledge there are issues inherit in such paradigms, where a forced-choice response 
format is used to categorise static images supposedly conveying a single emotion (see 
Russell, 1994 and Nelson & Russell, 2013 for detailed discussions). Whilst reviewing all 
limitations associated with this paradigm is beyond the scope for the current research, it is 
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important to reflect on paradigm limitations that are pertinent to the current studies, i.e. those 
that may be sensitive to cognitive load. 
In the current study we used easily recognisable expression images of young 
Caucasian adults from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009). Whilst cognitive load 
did significantly reduce categorisation accuracies, overall people were relatively apt at 
categorising expressions, with mean accuracy rates in the high 70s for the upright images (see 
Table 1). Evidence suggests that less recognisable and ambiguous expressions are more 
effortful to categorise. For example, Orgeta and Philips (2007) found elderly, compared to 
young individuals, were worse at recognising certain low intensity emotions, which may be 
partially due to age related cognitive decline. And Neta, Norris and Whalen (2009) found 
ambiguous expressions took longer to respond to, denoting a potentially greater draw on 
cognitive resources compared to easily recognisable ones. Since most everyday interactions 
are based on subtler low intensity expressions (Motley & Camden, 1988; Hess, Blairy & 
Kleck, 1997), the impact of externally imposed cognitive limitations on lower intensity and 
more ambiguous expression processing may well be more substantial and would be an aspect 
worthy of future investigations.  
Another factor which may interact with cognitive load’s impact on expression 
categorisation is the ethnic familiarity of the presented faces. It is well established that we do 
worse at processing expressions and identity of faces from ethnically unfamiliar compared to 
familiar ones, the so-called in-group advantage effect (Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2002). This 
hindered performance for unfamiliar ethnicity faces implies this process is more demanding 
for us and may well be one that requires comparatively more cognitive resources. In the 
current experiments all images were of Caucasian models, whereas the participant sample 
included both Caucasian and non-Caucasian ethnicities (South London students). The 
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ethnicity analysis (see footnote 2) revealed that both ethnicity groups categorised expressions 
in the Caucasian images equally well. The absence of the in-group advantage effect is most 
likely due to the high familiarity to different ethnicities in this sample (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2003; Biehl et al., 1997). The experiment would need to be replicated with participants from 
less ethnically diverse populations to assess potential effects between cognitive load and 
image ethnicity familiarity (e.g. Matsumoto; 1990).  
 Finally we would like to take a step back and consider how the current findings aid 
understanding of affect processing in broader terms. Here we adopted a local single channel 
approach to consider how concurrent load influenced visual facial expression categorisation. 
A cognitive-attentional account was employed to explain the observed effects. However, the 
utility of a single channel approach such as this can have limitations (see Hall, Schmid Mast, 
2007). For example, information relating to a person’s affective state is not extracted from a 
single channel such as the visual facial expression in isolation, but rather other avenues of 
information such as body language and contextual information can influence our judgements 
(e.g. Righart & de Gelder, 2008; Willis, Palermo, & Burke, 2011). 
Moreover as reviewed in the introduction, expression categorisation has been 
investigated from both local and distal perspectives. Distal factors such as societal influences 
and personality differences are also known to influence expression categorisation (e.g. Said, 
Haxby & Todorov, 2011; Nowicki & Duke, 1994; Hall, Andrzejewski &Yopchick, 2009).  
Thus whilst the current research demonstrates that expression categorisation is indeed 
sensitive to cognitive load and provides a novel cognitive-attentional based explanation for 
the impact, it is important to acknowledge that a more integrative approach taking account of 
both personality as well as cognitive factors, and employing multi-channel designs are 
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required to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how and why we respond to facial 
expressions the way we do.  
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